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his article will address two major analytical questions. First, what are the 
necessary and suffi cient conditions for China to acquire aircraft carriers? 
Second, what are the major implications if China does acquire aircraft carriers? 
Existing analyses on China’s aircraft carrier ambitions are quite insightful but 
also somewhat inadequate and must therefore be updated. Some, for instance, 
argue that with the advent of the Taiwan issue as China’s top threat priority by 
late 1996 and the retirement of Liu Huaqing as vice chair of China’s Central 
Military Commission (CMC) in 1997, aircraft carriers are no longer considered 
vital.1 In that view, China does not require aircraft carriers to capture sea and air 
superiority in a war over Taiwan, and China’s most powerful carrier proponent 
(Liu) can no longer infl uence relevant decision making. Other scholars suggest 
that China may well acquire small-deck aviation platforms, such as helicopter 
carriers, to fulfi ll secondary security missions. These missions include naval di-
plomacy, humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, and antisubmarine warfare.2 
The present authors conclude, however, that China’s aircraft carrier ambitions 
may be larger than the current literature has predicted. Moreover, the major 
implications of China’s acquiring aircraft carriers may need to be explored more 
carefully in order to inform appropriate reactions on the part of the United 
States and other Asia-Pacifi c naval powers. 
This article updates major changes in the four major conditions that are 
necessary and would be largely suffi cient for China to acquire aircraft carriers: 
leadership endorsement, fi nancial affordability, a relatively concise naval strat-
egy that defi nes the missions of carrier operations, and availability of requisite 
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technologies. We argue that in spite of some unresolved issues, these changes 
suggest that China is likely to acquire medium-sized aircraft carriers in the me-
dium term for “near seas” missions and for gaining operational experience, so 
that it can acquire large carriers for “far seas” operations in the long term.
These four major conditions, or variables, can be either dependent or inde-
pendent, depending on circumstances. Generally speaking, central leadership 
endorsement of the idea of acquiring aircraft carriers may depend on whether 
the required money and technologies are available and whether an appropriate 
naval strategy is formulated. There are some circumstances, however, in which 
central leadership endorsement may in fact make money and technologies more 
readily available and appropriate strategy more forthcoming.3 Because of such 
variation in the relationship among these four major conditions (variables), 
each will be discussed separately.
The article has fi ve sections. The fi rst four examine changes in the four major 
conditions of leadership endorsement, fi nancial affordability, appropriate naval 
strategy, and requisite technologies. The concluding section discusses the major 
implications if China actually acquires aircraft carriers. 
LEADERSHIP ENDORSEMENT
Liu Huaqing, the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) commander 1982–88 
and a CMC member (and its vice chair 1992–97) from 1988 to 1997, strongly 
advocated carrier operations;4 however, this idea was not endorsed by members 
of the central civilian leadership, like Jiang Zemin. Lack of funding and requi-
site technologies may have played a role, as well as a relatively low dependence 
of China’s economy on external sources of energy and raw materials. More im-
portant, however, the proposal contradicted the “new security concept” Jiang 
endorsed in 1997, which highlighted “soft” approaches to China’s maritime as 
well as land neighbors. This concept contributed signifi cantly to China’s signing 
of a declaration of code of conduct over the South China Sea in 2002 and the 
Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in 2003 with Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations (ASEAN) members, as well as to the founding of the Shanghai Coopera-
tion Organization in 2001.5 Because of these political and diplomatic initiatives, 
the primary missions Jiang assigned to the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) dur-
ing his reign were rather narrow and limited, confi ned primarily to the defense 
of national sovereignty; the integrity of China’s territorial land, air, and waters; 
and deterrence of Taiwan from declaring formal independence. 
Hu Jintao succeeded Jiang as the Chinese Communist Party general secre-
tary in 2002 and became the CMC chair in 2004. He has required the PLA to 
fulfi ll more expansive and externally oriented missions that were absent in 
Jiang’s era: to secure China’s newly emerging interests in outer, maritime, and 
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electromagnetic space, and to contribute to world peace through international 
peacekeeping and humanitarian relief. Hu has also endorsed a “far-seas opera-
tions” (远海作战) concept for the PLAN, one that implies some new level of 
power-projection capability.6 
Such a change is understandable for two reasons, both due to recent years of 
rapid economic growth. First, China has begun to develop a stronger sense of 
vulnerability stemming from its growing dependence on external energy and 
raw materials, and it has become more interested in the sea-lanes that bring in 
these resources. Second, investments overseas and the number of its citizens 
working there are both growing. These factors should have made the idea of 
acquiring aircraft carriers more acceptable to the central civilian leadership fol-
lowing Jiang’s retirement. 
There are several indicators that this idea has been endorsed by the central 
civilian leadership. On 6 March 2007, a PLA lieutenant general revealed to the 
media at the annual National People’s Congress that a project to develop aircraft 
carriers was proceeding smoothly. Ten days later, the minister of China’s Com-
mission of Science and Technology in National Defense, Zhang Yuchuan, stated 
that China would build its own aircraft carriers and that preparation was well 
under way.7 More recently, a spokesperson of China’s Ministry of National De-
fense, Major General Qian Lihua, claimed that China has every right to acquire 
an aircraft carrier.8 But more important, China’s defense minister, General Li-
ang Guanglie, recently told the visiting Japanese defense minister, Yasukazu 
Hamada, that China will not remain forever the only major power without an 
aircraft carrier.9 All of these statements suggest that China has the intention to 
acquire aircraft carriers. These forthright comments on such a politically sensi-
tive issue would have been impossible had they not been endorsed by the central 
party leadership.10 
FINANCIAL AFFORDABILITY
One major reason for China’s past hesitation to acquire aircraft carriers was 
a lack of funding. When Mao proposed at a CMC meeting on 21 June 1958 to 
build “railways on the high seas”—oceangoing fl eets of merchant ships escorted 
by aircraft carriers—China’s defense budget was a mere fi ve billion yuan/ren-
minbi (RMB). Of that, only RMB 1.5 billion could be allocated to weapons ac-
quisition, and out of this share the PLAN received less than RMB 200 million. 
A 1,600-ton Soviet-built Gordy-class destroyer cost RMB 30 million, and the 
PLAN could afford only four of them.11 
The carrier project was again placed on the policy agenda in the early 1970s, 
but fi nancial constraints still prevented the initiation of a serious program. 
From 1971 to 1982, China’s annual defense budget averaged about seventeen 
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billion RMB. Out of less than six billion allocated for weapons acquisition each 
year, the PLAN could expect to receive only several hundred million, whereas 
one Type 051 destroyer cost RMB 100 million. With the endorsement of party 
leader Hua Guofeng in the late 1970s, China planned to acquire an eighteen-
thousand-ton light aircraft carrier, either through import or coproduction, and 
it was to carry the British vertical/short-takeoff-and-landing (V/STOL) Harrier 
aircraft. The project had to be scrapped, because the price asked by British sup-
pliers was too high. Furthermore, Deng Xiaoping, succeeding Hua as the para-
mount leader, decided to cut defense spending in order to free up resources for 
the civilian economy.12
From the middle to late 1980s, Liu Huaqing lobbied feverishly for carrier 
operations. He proposed feasibility studies in the seventh fi ve-year plan (FYP), 
for 1991–95; research and development on key aspects of platform and aircraft 
in the eighth FYP; and production 
in the early 2000s. His plan was 
shelved, partly because of insuffi -
cient funding.13 While the defense 
budget had been increasing since 
the early 1990s, its growth could not catch up with the rising cost of aircraft car-
riers, as modern designs integrated more advanced aircraft, air-defense systems, 
and electronics. Funding priority was instead given to developing submarines.
By 2007, however, China’s fi nances had improved remarkably, with govern-
ment revenue reaching $750 billion—lower than the $2.6 trillion for the United 
States but higher than Japan’s $500 billion. China’s foreign exchange reserve 
now ranked fi rst in the world, reaching $1.4 trillion. As a result, China’s annual 
formal defense budget had grown to $46 billion (RMB 350.9 billion). Accord-
ing to offi cial estimate, about a third of China’s formal defense budget, or $15.3 
billion that year, was used for weapons acquisition. Given that naval moderniza-
tion is currently a high priority, the PLAN is probably now receiving several bil-
lion dollars a year just for weapons acquisition, and this fi gure is likely to grow 
in coming years.14 
Aircraft carriers come in a wide variety of sizes, costs, and capabilities. Tak-
ing into consideration the lower labor and material costs in China, the cost of 
building a medium-sized, conventionally powered, sixty-thousand-ton carrier 
similar to the Russian Kuznetsov class is likely to be above two billion dollars.15 
But that cost is just the start, as a carrier needs aircraft and escorts. A Russian Su-
33 carrier-based combat aircraft costs fi fty million dollars, so a notional carrier 
air wing of about fi fty Su-33s, several airborne early-warning (AEW) planes, and 
a number of antisubmarine warfare (ASW) and search-and-rescue helicopters 
may cost more than three billion. A Russian Sovremenny-class guided-missile 
It appears that in the short run China is likely 
to acquire a mediuim-sized carrier for limited, 
air defense–dominant missions.
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destroyer costs about $600 million, so an escort force consisting of a number of 
guided-missile destroyers, frigates, and supply ships may cost more than four 
billion dollars. That makes the likely total cost of one carrier battle group about 
ten billion dollars; the price of two carrier battle groups, which is the number 
that China is likely to acquire, would be around twenty billion. That cost, spread 
over a period of ten years of development, would constitute only a moderate pro-
portion of the projected naval weapons acquisition budget during that time. The 
annual cost for regular training, maintenance, repairs, and fuel for two carrier 
battle groups can be estimated at about 10 percent of the construction cost of 
the carrier, or $200 million for each of the two battle groups. This is based on a 
useful rule of thumb derived from U.S. experience. Such a fi gure can be readily 
covered by another third of the annual naval budget, which is specifi cally allo-
cated for such a purpose. This proportion, like the weapons acquisition propor-
tion, is also likely to grow over the years as the defense budget grows because of 
rapid economic growth.16
NAVAL STRATEGY
Leadership endorsement and fi nancial affordability are necessary for China to 
acquire aircraft carriers, but they are not suffi cient. A fairly concise naval strat-
egy that defi nes the missions of the carrier battle groups is also needed. It is, 
however, more problematic than the two previous conditions. 
“Near-coast defense” (近岸防御) defi ned China’s naval strategy from the 
1950s until the early 1980s. It highlighted counter–amphibious landing opera-
tions earlier against the Taiwan Guomindang government’s attempt to recap-
ture the mainland and later against a possible Soviet invasion from the seas, and 
as a result it did not require aircraft carriers. In the late 1980s, a “near-seas ac-
tive defense” (近海积极防御) strategy, largely operationalized by Liu Huaqing, 
was endorsed to replace near-coast defense. This strategy requires the PLAN to 
develop credible operational capabilities against potential opponents in China’s 
three “near seas”—the South China Sea, East China Sea, and Yellow Sea—or the 
space within and slightly beyond the “fi rst island chain,” which extends from 
Kurile Islands through the main islands of Japan, the Ryukyu Archipelago, Tai-
wan, and the Philippines to Borneo. 
According to Liu, at least two major issues within this expanded operational 
space require aircraft carriers: “to solve the need for struggle against Taiwan 
[independence] [解决对台斗争需要] and to resolve the dispute over the Nansha 
[Spratlys] Archipelago [解决南沙群岛争端].” In operational terms, Liu believed 
that “whether the attack type or the V/STOL type, they [aircraft carriers] are for 
the purpose of resolving issues of [fl eet] air defense and sea attack” (防空和对海
攻击问题). Liu particularly stressed that “the objective for us to acquire aircraft 
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carriers is not to compete against the U.S. and the Soviet Union.”17 This implied 
that what Liu wished to acquire was a medium-sized, conventionally powered 
platform for limited, air defense–dominant missions, not a large, nuclear-
powered one for expansive, sea/land-attack-dominant missions.18
Of the two major issues, Liu clearly privileged the Spratlys dispute. For in-
stance, he highlighted the need to compare the cost-effectiveness of employing 
carriers and carrier-based combat aircraft as opposed to land-based aviation 
divisions, combat aircraft, and air-
refueling tankers. This shows that 
he was particularly concerned 
about lack of air cover for distant 
naval operations over the Spratlys. 
However, naval operations over 
Taiwan can be covered by land-based combat aircraft, even though, as Liu men-
tioned, without carriers, air operations over Taiwan could be more costly because 
more airfi elds and land-based combat aircraft are needed due to the reduced loi-
tering time in the air.19 The 1996 Taiwan Strait crisis and the 1997 retirement of 
Liu Huaqing, which helped to consolidate further Jiang Zemin’s position as the 
CMC chair, clearly contributed to the shelving of the PLAN’s carrier project.20 
While articulating the near-seas active defense strategy in the 1980s, Liu 
Huaqing stated that the PLAN would operate within and around the fi rst island 
chain, or in China’s near seas, for a long time to come. But he also suggested 
that the growth of the economy and strengthening of science and technology 
would translate into expansion of Chinese naval power in the long run. This 
in turn would allow the PLAN to extend its operational range from the near 
seas to the “middle and far seas” (中远海), or the space between the fi rst and 
second island chains, the latter stretching from northern Japan to the Northern 
Mariana Islands, Guam and farther southward, and beyond. This would also 
allow the PLAN to “strike the enemy’s rear” through exterior-line operations 
if China’s coast, or interior line, were attacked by an opponent. Liu, however, 
placed emphasis on the primacy of “near-seas operations” (近海作战为主) and 
regarded “middle- and far-seas operations as [only] supportive and auxiliary” 
(中远海作战为辅).21
By 2004, however, such an emphasis seems to have shifted somewhat. China’s 
naval analysts, for instance, now argue that China’s naval strategy should shift 
from near seas to far-seas operations.22 They hold that such operations are nec-
essary because of China’s increasing vulnerability relating to distant sea-lanes 
and choke points. China’s ever-expanding oceangoing fl eet of merchant ships, 
especially tankers, also needs to be protected, as does China’s growing over-
seas investment, and as do the increasing number of Chinese citizens living and 
Leadership endorsement and fi nancial afford-
ability are necessary for China to acquire air-
craft carriers, but they are not suffi cient. A fair-
ly concise naval strategy is also needed.
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working overseas. Moreover, China’s prosperous coastline and resource-rich 
exclusive economic zones and territories need to be secured where in dispute. 
These areas, however, are diffi cult to secure, because they are so long and wide 
and their fl anks are so exposed. This problem extends into such close forward 
positions as China’s near seas, which are partially blocked by the fi rst island 
chain, and the few exits through straits and channels are mostly narrow and 
controlled by others, making it diffi cult to gain initiative by maneuvering out 
through them. Many of the navies operating in these near seas are quite for-
midable, including the U.S., Japanese, Russian, Taiwanese, ASEAN-state, and 
Indian navies. They render the PLAN more vulnerable, and they limit, and even 
reduce the effectiveness of, the near-seas active-defense strategy for both deter-
rence and war fi ghting.23 
According to China’s naval analysts, to alleviate vulnerability and enhance 
effectiveness the PLAN needs to break out of interior-line constraints associ-
ated with the narrow and near seas within and around the fi rst island chain. 
Acquiring capabilities to operate in the far seas, the vast space beyond the fi rst 
island chain, would allow the PLAN to regain initiative and momentum. While 
“interior-line operations require near-seas capabilities, exterior-line operations 
are based on far-seas capabilities. . . . Far-seas capabilities make it possible to 
carry out offensive operations and ambush and sabotage operations in the far 
and vast naval battle-space beyond the fi rst island chain, and would have the 
effect of shock and awe on the enemy.” Forward operations and offense are cen-
tral to naval combat, because oceans have few invulnerable physical objects on 
which to base the defense, whereas naval platforms, once crippled, are hard to 
restore. An emphasis on offense also helps to optimize naval force structure. It 
is also more cost-effective, because as strikes become more long-range, precise, 
and powerful, and therefore more lethal, defense becomes more expensive to 
maintain. History also shows that a strategy of close and static defense led to the 
decisive defeat of the Qing navy in the fi rst Sino-Japanese War, in 1894.24
Far-seas strategy suggests that the PLAN needs to develop power-projection 
capabilities that can operate effectively in the more distant western Pacifi c and 
the eastern Indian Ocean. It also implies that the PLAN may come in direct con-
frontation with the U.S. Navy in the western Pacifi c—in, for instance, a com-
petition for sea access and denial in a crisis over Taiwan. Moreover, in the worst 
case, the PLAN may come into direct contact with the U.S. and Indian navies 
in competition for vital sea-lanes in the South China Sea and eastern Indian 
Ocean and for such choke points as the Malacca Strait. These scenarios may 
require the PLAN to acquire large, nuclear-powered aircraft carriers, very dif-
ferent from the medium, conventionally powered carriers for limited missions 
envisioned by Liu Huaqing. A key variable that may determine whether China 
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would acquire medium, conventionally powered carriers or the large, nuclear-
powered ones is whether requisite technologies are available. 
AVAILABILITY OF REQUISITE TECHNOLOGIES
Before discussing the specifi c carrier development route that the PLAN might 
follow, it is useful to spend a moment talking about aircraft carriers in general. 
Thinking about Aircraft Carriers
There are four main types of aircraft carriers operating worldwide today, as de-
fi ned by their method of launching and recovering aircraft. The fi rst—the most 
capable but also the most expensive—is the “catapult-assisted takeoff but arrest-
ed recovery” (CATOBAR) design. Originally created by the United Kingdom but 
perfected by the United States, this design philosophy is currently employed by 
the United States and France. Because catapults (currently using steam, though 
electromagnetic catapults have been proposed) are necessary for heavy aircraft 
capable of long range or heavy payloads (which in turn can perform a wider va-
riety of missions at greater range), the CATOBAR carrier is generally considered 
a prerequisite for a signifi cant carrier-borne power-projection capability.
The second carrier design is the “short takeoff but arrested recovery” (STOBAR) 
type. This design uses a rolling takeoff—often assisted by a ski-jump ramp—but 
aircraft return on board via arrested recovery. Most current non-U.S. aircraft carriers 
are of this type, including the Russian Kuznetsov class, a unit of which, Varyag, has 
been acquired by China. A STOBAR carrier is generally much simpler to build and 
maintain than a CATOBAR design but less capable, though it may still be a large, fast 
ship. STOBAR is less appropriate for the strike role, so a decision to forgo catapults 
may indicate intent to not perform the strike mission.
The third design, “short takeoff vertical landing” (STOVL), combines a roll-
ing takeoff—often assisted by a ski-jump ramp—with vertical recovery. This is 
the system Spain and the United Kingdom have used on their most recent units. 
Britain is currently evaluating a variant called “shipborne rolling vertical land-
ing,” or SRVL, for its new Queen Elizabeth class.25 As a general rule, aircraft ca-
pable of vertical landing can also take off vertically, but the performance penalty 
is high; a rolling, ski jump–assisted takeoff maximizes load or range. A STOVL 
design is likely be smaller than other types, but it still requires high speed to 
generate wind over the deck. The STOVL design severely limits strike and long-
range missions, but it is easier to build and maintain than types better suited 
to those tasks. STOVL generally represents the minimum capability needed for 
fi ghter-based air defense.
The fourth and fi nal type is the “vertical takeoff and landing” (VTOL) carri-
er. Compared to STOVL, a VTOL design forgoes even more aircraft operational 
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capability and allows for a slower (and thus less expensive) ship. Selecting VTOL 
over STOVL generally means either that the ship is intended to operate only 
helicopters, is designed for a function (e.g., amphibious assault) that constrains 
performance, or is really envisioned only for noncombat or general support 
missions. For fi xed-wing aircraft, the difference between STOVL and VTOL is 
generally the presence in the former of a ski-jump ramp at the front of the fl ight 
deck and the ability to make enough speed to generate wind over the deck. 
Several general rules of thumb are useful when thinking about aircraft car-
rier size and capabilities:
The more missions a carrier is to perform, the more aircraft it needs and the •
bigger the ship must be.
The longer the range or heavier the payload of the aircraft, the more likely •
the carrier will need catapults and arrested recovery.
The bigger the fl ight deck, the bigger the aircraft that can be operated. •
Also, the faster the carrier, the bigger the aircraft that can be operated. 
(Faster carriers require bigger propulsion spaces, so these factors are 
complementary.) Some missions are best performed by bigger aircraft.
Strike is a long-range, heavy-load mission, as is aerial refueling. •
One pays a penalty for VTOL capability. Even if the design of the aircraft •
does not involve performance compromises, which is a big assumption, it still 
takes extra fuel to take off vertically, because “there’s no such thing as a free 
launch,” and there will be much more restrictive weight limits on what one 
can “bring back” on landing—unused ordnance may have to be jettisoned. 
VTOL is at best ineffi cient, and at worst affects overall combat capability.
A large carrier is more effi cient—that is, it carries more aircraft per ton of •
displacement and can handle planes on board better than a small carrier.
Taken together, these considerations are powerful tools in analyzing what 
a PLAN carrier might look like, based on discussions of design features on the 
one hand—that is, “What can they do with what they intend to buy?”—and 
missions on the other—that is, “What do they need to buy to do what they say 
they want to do?” For example, the Russian-built Varyag is a ski jump–equipped 
STOBAR design, displacing sixty to sixty-fi ve thousand tons and with a long, 
thousand-foot fl ight deck. This makes it a relatively large carrier, smaller than 
an American Nimitz but larger than the French Charles de Gaulle, roughly com-
parable to both the American Kitty Hawk class and the British Queen Elizabeth. 
Note that one must be careful comparing displacements: with large, capacious 
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ships like carriers, the difference between empty, full, and standard loads can be 
tens of thousands of tons.
Due to the lack of catapults, fi xed-wing aircraft on Varyag are essentially con-
strained to air superiority—fl eet air defense or offensive air—or relatively short-
range strike.26 Varyag was intended to operate with a steam propulsion plant ca-
pable of thirty-two knots, but when sold to China it reportedly had no engines.27
Russia offi cially categorizes this type as a “heavy aircraft-carrying cruiser”; 
the limited abilities of its embarked aircraft and its Russian-style heavy missile 
load are consistent with this description.28 Its usual suggested role is to support 
and defend strategic missile–carrying submarines, surface ships, and maritime 
missile-carrying aircraft. In other words, while it may have some antiship ca-
pability, both in its aircraft and its missiles, it is not really designed to support 
long-range strike missions.
Medium-Carrier Options 
Major General Qian Lihua stated, in his November 2008 comment already cited, 
that if China acquires an aircraft carrier, it will serve mainly the purpose of 
near-seas active defense. Thus it appears that in the short run China is likely 
to acquire a medium-sized carrier for limited, air defense–dominant missions. 
For a medium, conventionally powered carrier intended for these purposes, the 
requisite technologies are generally available. China has been analyzing Varyag
since 2002.29 The Chinese design and construction of super containerships, 
tankers, and liquefi ed-natural-gas carriers should also be useful experience for 
building the hulls of aircraft carriers, although carriers are much more complex 
ships. China also has the simulation and testing facilities necessary for research 
and development, such as large-scale ship-model basins and wind tunnels, and it 
has been gaining engineering and technical assistance from Russia and Ukraine, 
countries that have experience in designing and building medium-sized aircraft 
carriers. Furthermore, specialized construction materials, such as high-grade 
steel, can either be indigenously developed or acquired through import. More-
over, China has made substantial progress in information, automation, new ma-
terials, and maritime and space technologies, many of which can be integrated 
into carrier construction. Finally, while major technical bottlenecks exist and 
need to be resolved, China has experience in producing heavy steam and gas 
turbines, of which several units can be grouped together to provide suffi cient 
speed and range. 
For takeoff and landing, China is likely to choose a STOBAR design. China’s 
naval analysts have identified several benefits of a STOBAR design over a 
CATOBAR design. A STOBAR design, for instance, minimizes the space needed 
for water and fuel storage, maximizes the energy available for ship’s propulsion, 
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offers simpler production and maintenance, and reduces vulnerability to me-
chanical breakdowns, because of the absence of the steam catapult.30
Because the missions for medium carriers are more those of air cover for 
naval operations than those of more distant sea and land attack, air superior-
ity fi ghters with some sea/land-attack capabilities would be suffi cient. In this 
case, purchasing the Russian STOBAR-capable Su-33 combat aircraft, which can 
carry eight air-to-air missiles and one or two antiship cruise missiles (ASCMs), 
seems to be a realistic option, and indeed China has been negotiating with 
Russia for such a purchase.31 In 
the meantime, China may also 
attempt to upgrade a land-based 
combat aircraft of its own, such as 
the indigenous J-10 or the J-11B (a Chinese variant of the Russian Su-27), into a 
carrier-based aircraft. At a minimum, such an attempt would probably involve 
reinforcing the landing gears, wings, and fuselage of the aircraft for arrested 
recovery, which puts heavier stress on these components than standard runway 
landings.32
Similarly, China may purchase carrier-based Ka-31 AEW helicopters from 
Russia. The Ka-31 can patrol for two to three hours on end, with a detection 
range of 150 kilometers for sea targets and 100–150 kilometers for low-altitude 
aircraft and ASCMs, and it can direct engagement against fi fteen targets at one 
time. Assisted by shipborne phased-array radars, these ranges and capacity are 
suffi cient for limited missions in the near seas. It is also likely that China may 
upgrade its shipborne Z-8 (a variant of the French Super Frelon) to a carrier-
based AEW platform and develop carrier-based unmanned aerial vehicles 
(UAVs) with electro-optical, infrared, and radar sensors for intelligence collec-
tion, surveillance, and reconnaissance at sea. UAVs can patrol for a long time at 
high altitude and are diffi cult to detect.33 
The Chinese approach to carrier development is likely to be incremental. 
Therefore, China may attempt to gain engineering and operational experience 
by moving from smaller and simpler platforms to larger and more complex ones. 
This means that the option of building small V/STOL carriers should not be 
completely excluded.34 On the other hand, many Chinese naval analysts argue 
that the missions that small carriers can accomplish are too limited, because the 
number and types of aircraft they carry and their operational radii are too lim-
ited. To secure China’s eighteen-thousand-kilometer coastline, the “three mil-
lion square km of maritime territories,” and the nation’s expanding maritime 
interests, as well as to further learning and adaptation, these analysts believe, 
building medium-sized carriers is more appropriate as the fi rst step in realizing 
China’s aircraft carrier ambitions.35 
China’s aircraft carrier ambitions may be larger 
than the current literature has predicted.
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Large-Carrier Options 
For far-seas operations, a medium-sized carrier may not be adequate. A 
STOBAR design, for instance, limits aircraft takeoff weight and shifts the full 
burden of takeoff propulsion onto the aircraft, thus increasing the amount of 
fuel consumed at that stage. This restricts the fuel and weapons payload that an 
aircraft can carry, thereby reducing its range, loitering time, and strike capabili-
ties. STOBAR is also more affected by wind, tide, rolling, and pitching. Further-
more, it needs more fl ight-deck space for takeoff and landing, thus limiting the 
parking space and having an adverse effect on takeoff frequency–based crisis 
reaction. In comparison, the CATOBAR design, which is mostly associated with 
large carriers, minimizes aircraft fuel consumption on takeoff, thus enabling 
better payload, range, loitering time, and strike capability. Its runway require-
ment, while greater than in a V/STOL design, is also minimal, thus allowing 
more fl ight-deck parking and faster launches, even simultaneous launch and 
recovery, resulting in quicker crisis response.
CATOBAR designs can also launch heavier fi xed-wing AEW and ASW air-
craft.36 For far-seas operations, AEW platforms are particularly indispensable. 
China’s military analysts, for instance, are impressed by the American E-2C, 
which can patrol up to six hours, monitor a sea area of 12.50 million square 
kilometers, and track two thousand targets, directing engagements against forty 
of them simultaneously. They believe that with its detection range of 741 kilo-
meters for surface targets, 556 kilometers for aircraft, and 270 kilometers for 
missiles and its ability to patrol 180–200 kilometers away from the carrier battle 
group, the E-2C, together with the combat patrol aircraft, establishes a three-
hundred-kilometer outer air-defense perimeter, deeper than the range of most 
ASCMs.37 Without a similar air-defense perimeter, Chinese analysts believe, a 
Chinese carrier battle group would be a “sitting duck,” particularly if it engages 
highly stealthy U.S. combat aircraft.
Similarly, far-seas operations require far-more-capable carrier-based combat 
aircraft than does near-seas active defense. Such an aircraft should be capable of 
high speed, large combat radius, long-range sea/land attack, and stealth.38 Final-
ly, the tremendous thermal energy that a large carrier consumes, particularly for 
propulsion and catapult-steam generation, suggests that a nuclear power plant is 
preferable to a conventional one. 
Because China has had no experience in building and operating an aircraft 
carrier, acquiring a working, medium-sized carrier may be a necessary stage to 
gain such experience in the near future. Nonetheless, China’s naval analysts are 
particularly impressed by the large U.S. carriers, including their most advanced 
iteration, the Gerald R. Ford class, and its related technologies.39 Further, there 
are indicators that research has been done on tackling some major technical 
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issues for constructing large carriers.40 The process of acquiring such carriers, 
however, is likely to be costly and protracted.
WHAT ARE THE IMPLICATIONS?
In spite of unresolved issues, China is getting closer to realizing its aircraft car-
rier ambitions in terms of leadership endorsement, fi nancial affordability, naval 
strategy, and requisite technologies. China is likely to develop medium-sized 
aircraft carriers in the medium term for near-seas missions and to gain opera-
tional experience so that it can develop larger carriers for far-seas operations in 
the long term. In this section we offer some thoughts on the potential missions 
of such ships, the factors that go into defi ning those missions, and the regional 
implications.
An aircraft carrier is not a solo-deploying ship. To be survivable in an intense 
combat environment, it needs escorts to protect it. While China has acquired 
new surface combatants with sophisticated antisurface and antiair capabilities, 
it continues to lag behind in the area of ASW. Unless one is willing to assume 
that the PLAN does not believe in the antisurface utility of submarines—a con-
clusion at odds with its own submarine acquisition efforts—the lack of antisub-
marine escort capability implies at least one (and perhaps all) of the following:
China intends to address its lack of ASW capability in the future and is •
willing to accept increased risk in the short term, or
China thinks that it has a solution to the ASW problem, or•
China does not envision its aircraft carriers as becoming the targets of •
submarines.
All three are likely true to some degree, and indeed they may be interrelated. 
Aircraft carriers are long–lead time projects, and it may be that China’s decision 
makers have decided to start that program fi rst, accepting that they may end up 
fi elding a carrier before its ASW support is ready. Or they may have decided that 
they have a solution to the ASW problem in the form of mines—implying in turn 
that they believe they can control the location of the battle—or through speed and 
maneuver, which itself may be an argument for a big, fast nuclear carrier.
Or perhaps China does not expect to use its aircraft carriers against a fi rst-
class opponent with submarine capability. For that matter, perhaps China does 
not expect to use its carriers in combat at all. Many missions (such as those 
detailed below) would either involve smaller regional powers, unable to mount 
a signifi cant submarine threat, or be strictly for peacetime. The United States 
has traditionally viewed aircraft carriers as instruments of high-intensity com-
bat, but their utility in other areas is signifi cant. Imagine, for instance, a carrier 
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providing surface-search capability via a small number of airborne assets. While 
high-intensity carrier operations require frequent replenishments of jet fuel, 
low-intensity ops could continue for weeks with minimal support, while main-
taining a surge capacity if needed.41 Since China lacks overseas bases, it may be 
willing to make do with a relatively small increase in capability in a given situ-
ation and hence be willing to operate carriers in ways the U.S. Navy is unlikely 
to consider. For this reason, it will be very interesting to see how many and what 
types of aircraft the PLAN decides is appropriate for its carriers.
It is important to note that while China understands the potential vulnerabil-
ity of aircraft carriers to concerted attack, the problems facing China and those 
facing the United States are not similar.42 U.S. Navy aircraft carriers operating in 
the western Pacifi c face a sophisticated reconnaissance-strike complex of over-
the-horizon radars, supersonic cruise missiles, and antiship homing ballistic 
missiles. A PLAN aircraft carrier operating in the same geographic area has none 
of these concerns; rather, a PLAN carrier has these systems backing it up.
With the above points as a backdrop, one can readily envision fi ve PLAN car-
rier missions: 
1. SLOC protection. In recent years China has become concerned regarding 
its sea lines of communication through the Strait of Malacca and other 
areas outside the range of its land-based airpower. Even more recently, 
Chinese warships have undertaken antipiracy missions in the Gulf of 
Aden. Whether the mission is constabulary or combative in nature, 
an aircraft carrier provides useful capabilities, including facilitation of 
extended surface-search capabilities via fi xed-wing and helicopter assets, 
and “visit, board, search, and seizure” via helicopter. Moreover, such a 
mission would likely be welcomed by the international community—
including the United States.
2. Deployment to overseas crisis locations. Because Chinese overseas interests 
have grown extensively, such deployment serves to deter threats to Chinese 
overseas interests and reassure security of these interests.
3. Exclusive economic zone/territorial enforcement. China has extensive 
territorial claims in the South China Sea, including the Spratly Islands. 
Small amounts of airpower in these areas—even just to maintain a surface 
picture—could confer a tremendous advantage. 
4. Humanitarian aid and disaster relief. The 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami 
demonstrated the utility of aircraft carriers in disaster relief operations, 
both as helicopter-staging platforms and for the use of the power-
generation, water-purifi cation, and medical capabilities aboard. Using a 
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Chinese carrier in such a contingency would potentially produce a great 
deal of prestige and goodwill for China, perhaps even more than would a 
ship specifi cally designed for disaster relief, reassuring regional neighbors 
as to Chinese intentions. Again, such a humanitarian deployment by the 
PLAN would likely be welcomed by the international community.
5. Taiwan contingency. The prospect of the use of an aircraft carrier in 
support of an invasion or coercion campaign is often cited. Given the 
PLAN’s lack of profi ciency in ASW, a PLAN carrier participating in such a 
scenario would make a tempting target for opposing forces. Nonetheless, 
it would have the potential to complicate the problem by increasing the 
axes of attack, especially if U.S. entry into the confl ict could be forestalled. 
Even if a feint (after all, China’s close mainland air bases could generate 
far more sorties than could one or two carriers), a carrier’s presence 
would likely prompt the United States or Taiwan to “honor the threat” and 
allocate forces accordingly, which could be signifi cant in a short confl ict.
For the fi rst four missions listed above, a carrier seems like overkill, or 
at best a suboptimal use of resources. In strict terms that is true, but China at-
taches great symbolic value to a Chinese aircraft carrier as physical evidence of 
the nation’s coming of age as a great naval power. China may feel it gains more 
through incidental use of an aircraft carrier in humanitarian aid/disaster relief 
or other noncombat missions than it would with purpose-built (but less presti-
gious) platforms. 
FINAL THOUGHTS
For regional confl icts short of full-scale warfare, a Chinese aircraft carrier has 
the potential to complicate seriously the calculations of competitors in the re-
gion. The only nations in the region likely to be able to stand up against even 
a modest Chinese air wing are Japan, South Korea, and, going a little farther 
afi eld, India. A PLAN carrier would have the effect of extending Chinese air ca-
pabilities without requiring overseas air bases. Nonetheless, while a nuclear car-
rier may be homeported in China, supplying it with jet fuel, food, ammunition, 
and other consumables becomes harder with distance. The U.S. Navy solves this 
problem with an extensive series of overseas logistics bases and large, fast re-
plenishment ships that support the operations of carriers, themselves operating 
largely from the continental United States. Lacking such support mechanisms, a 
Chinese carrier is likely to stay closer to home, but it may still require a Chinese 
support presence overseas.
For the United States, a PLAN aircraft carrier is probably of little day-to-day 
concern, at least until the PLA develops an ASW capability. In peacetime, the 
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U.S. Navy is unlikely to consider a Chinese carrier a threat, and it may perhaps 
even welcome Chinese assumption of great-power naval responsibilities in such 
maritime constabulary operations as counterpiracy. In wartime, for the foresee-
able future, a Chinese air wing is unlikely to threaten U.S. naval forces seriously, 
and China’s limited ASW capability provides persuasive options to an Ameri-
can commander. This is not to say that a Chinese carrier would not complicate 
American planning, however, as even threats that can be neutralized require 
allocation of resources to do so.
In the short to medium terms, therefore, China’s acquisition of aircraft carri-
ers offers more opportunities than challenges. Medium-sized carriers would be 
for limited, air defense–dominant missions in local confl icts within the fi rst is-
land chain. They could be easily contained, being exposed and made vulnerable 
by their large profi les in so limited an operational space. Developing such carri-
ers would also divert funding from building advanced submarines or advanced 
missiles that arguably pose greater threats. Also, carriers could perform nontra-
ditional security missions that are compatible with the goals of other navies in 
the Asia-Pacifi c region, thus contributing to maritime security cooperation.
In the long term, however, if China can overcome the technological obstacles 
and gain the operational experience needed to build large, nuclear-powered car-
riers in substantial numbers and correct the defi ciencies in its antisubmarine ca-
pabilities, the PLA Navy may pose more challenges than opportunities. Several 
such carrier-based strike groups could project Chinese power beyond the “far 
seas” to the still more distant and vast “near oceans” (近洋) and “far oceans” (远
洋). The much improved sensors, sustainability, stealth, networking, range, and 
strike capabilities and self-protection of such highly integrated battle groups 
could drive the cost of containing and fi ghting them much higher. 
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